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Abstract. This article surveys the existing literature on the occupation policy Italy conducted 
in Southeastern Europe during the Second World War. The whole subject was largely ne-
glected by scholars of contemporary Italian history up to the 1990s, but in the last twenty years 
a consistent flow of studies has begun to appear. The reasons for the previous disregard of 
the topic and, now, the growing interest in it are investigated in the first part of this article. 
The second part focuses on work done in recent years. It evaluates the strengths and weak-
nesses of this new literature, and maps out a series of a blank spots that should be addressed 
by future research. 
Paolo Fonzi is a Gerda Henkel Research Fellow at the Department of History at the Humboldt 
University in Berlin.
An Almost Forgotten Past (1945-1990) 
Amazing as it may seem almost seventy years after the end of the war, the 
Italian occupation1 of the Balkan countries between 1941 and 1943 is still a much 
under-researched topic. This is, first and foremost, due to the extreme delay with 
which the subject started to come to the attention of Italian historians. As I detail 
below, the first comprehensive study on Italian occupation policies during the 
Second World War, Davide Rodogno’s Il nuovo ordine mediterraneo, was published 
as late as 2003, and this was a revised version of a young author’s dissertation.2 
The lack of interest in the subject shown by Italian historians is particularly 
1  For brevity’s sake, I use the term ‘occupation’ to refer to all forms of rule established 
by the Italians. Viewed from the perspective of international law, however, they fall within 
different categories: purely military occupation (Greece and parts of the Croatian territory), 
personal union (Albania), governorship (Montenegro, Dalmatia), and annexation (Province 
of Ljubljana, Kosovo).
2  Davide Rodogno, Il nuovo ordine mediterraneo. Le politiche di occupazione dell’Italia 
fascista in Europa, Torino 2003 (Engl. translation, Fascism’s European Empire. Italian 
Occupation During the Second World War, Cambridge 2006).
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surprising if one considers that the experience of occupation shaped the life of 
many Italians and affected Italian postwar society significantly. In September 
1943, approximately 650,000 Italian soldiers—half of the Italian troops stationed 
outside Italy in World War II—were garrisoned in several regions of Southeast-
ern Europe, and to this figure we should add the civil personnel employed in 
administration and the many Italians—soldiers’ relatives, for example—whose 
lives were indirectly influenced by the process of occupation.3 
Not surprisingly, then, enquiry into the reasons why this experience did not 
find its way into scholarship or into the collective memory of Italians for so 
many years has become a historiographical subject of its own.4 Historians have 
attributed responsibility for this huge case of amnesia to a conscious strategy 
of denial propagated by Italy’s postwar elites. In a recent, widely acclaimed 
book, the Italian historian Filippo Focardi has shown how the myth of the ‘good 
Italian’, and its counterpart, the myth of the ‘bad German’, were established by 
the Italian elites after 1943 as a self-acquitting master narrative to downplay 
culpability for events during the Second World War.5 According to this narra-
tive, the policy of the Italian occupiers had been extremely benevolent, due to 
their ‘mild’ or ‘Mediterranean’ national character. As in many other European 
countries, the harshness of occupation by the Germans in the last phase of the 
war swayed Italian public opinion towards a strong sense of victimization. 
Italians projected their own responsibility onto the outsider and used this to 
obliterate memory of Fascism’s aggressive policy on their own side of the Axis.6 
This ‘retroactive de-fascistisation’, as Emilio Gentile has expressively called it,7 
has affected historiographic scholarship, which has consistently privileged the 
years following the armistice with the Allies in September 1943, and within this 
frame, has focused overwhelmingly on the Italian resistance. A telling instance 
is the fact that an entire bookshelf of studies exists on the massacre of the Acqui 
3  In the same period, approximately two million soldiers were stationed in Italy proper, 
cf. Giorgio Rochat, Le guerre italiane. Dall’impero d’Etiopia alla disfatta 1935-1943, Torino 
2005, 322.
4  Unfortunately, there has been no attempt to investigate whether, in the postwar years, 
memory of occupation was kept alive in private or small-range communications such as local 
newspapers. An example of how productive such an investigation might be is offered by the 
project of oral interviews on ‘the Holocaust in family memory’ conducted in Germany, cf. Sabine 
Moller / Karoline Tschuggnall / Harald Welzer, eds, Opa war kein Nazi. Nationalsozialismus 
und Holocaust im Familiengedächtnis, Frankfurt/M. 2002.
5  Filippo Focardi, Il cattivo tedesco e il bravo italiano. La rimozione delle colpe della secon-
da guerra mondiale, Roma, Bari 2013.
6  A recent study based on private correspondence and memoirs has shown how many 
Italians supported imperialist policy under Fascism, cf. Mario Avagliano / Marco Palmieri, 
Vincere e vinceremo! Gli italiani al fronte 1940-1943, Bologna 2014.
7  Emilio Gentile, Fascismo. Storia e interpretazione, Bari 2002, VII.
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Division by the Wehrmacht on the islands of Cefalonia and Corfu in 1943,8 while 
we still have practically no reliable information on the occupation of the islands 
by the very same division between 1941 and 1943.
Interestingly, individual memory of the war assumes a very similar pattern. 
In most accounts published by war veterans, events after 8 September 1943—
which for many meant a long period of internment in German camps—almost 
completely overshadow any memory of the previous period. To be sure, a sense 
of having been victimized is no Italian peculiarity, but is a common characteris-
tic of many war veterans’ accounts. As Thomas Kühne and Benjamin Ziemann 
have noted, war experience is often narrated by soldiers as a ‘history of suffer-
ing’—one that systematically downplays individual agency and responsibility 
for the unfolding of violence.9 In Italy such sanitized memory patterns received 
a strong legitimization from above. 
A second reason for the unwillingness of the Italians to deal with this part of 
their past is that the memory of the war has been strongly obfuscated by a feel-
ing of shame, and indeed still is. From a military point of view, Italy’s prestige 
as a great power and pride in the Italian army as the embodiment of the nation 
were undermined by a series of bad performances during the years 1940-43. 
Having started the war as an equal partner of Germany, entitled to develop 
its own imperial policy, the catastrophic performance of the Italian army on 
many fronts turned the ‘parallel war’, as Mussolini had bombastically named 
it, into a ‘subaltern war’: Italy became a minor partner of the Third Reich.10 The 
  8  A recent publication, summarizing the most relevant studies in the field is Camillo Brezzi, 
ed, Né eroi, né martiri, soltanto soldati. La Divisione ‘Acqui’ a Cefalonia e Corfù: settembre 
1943, Bologna 2014. Another telling example is the fact that Hermann Frank Meyer’s study 
on the 1st Mountain Division, which addresses all crimes this division committed (not just 
the massacre of the Italians), has been translated in an abridged version under the title ‘The 
massacre of Cefalonia and the 1st German Mountain Division’, cf. Hermann Frank Meyer, 
Il massacro di Cefalonia e la 1º divisione da montagna tedesca, Udine 2013. The German 
original is Hermann Frank Meyer, Blutiges Edelweiß. Die 1. Gebirgs-Division im Zweiten 
Weltkrieg, Berlin 2007.
  9  Thomas Kühne / Benjamin Ziemann, Militärgeschichte in der Erweiterung. 
Konjunkturen, Interpretationen, Konzepte, in: Thomas Kühne / Benjamin Ziemann, eds, 
Was ist Militärgeschichte?, Paderborn 2000, 9-46.
10  Malte König, Kooperation als Machtkampf. Das faschistische Achsenbündnis Berlin-
Rom im Krieg 1940/41, Köln 2007. The war against Greece as an awkward lieu de mémoire 
is dealt with in Giorgio Rochat, La guerra di Grecia, in: Mario Isnenghi, ed, I luoghi della 
memoria. Simboli e miti dell’Italia unita, Roma, Bari 1997, 347-363. To get a sense of the 
feeling of marginalization experienced by members of the military in postwar Italy, cf. Giulio 
Mellini, Rivalutiamo l’esercito. L’esercito italiano nella seconda guerra mondiale, Bologna 
1948. Guri Schwarz has analysed how the military lost the monopoly of interpretation of 
the war experience after 1945 and how this influenced the memory of the war. Cf. Chapter 
Two ‘Pacificazione e democratizzazione: dal collasso dello Stato alla nascita della repubblica 
antifascista’, in: Guri Schwarz / Marco Mondini, Dalla guerra alla pace. Retoriche e pratiche 
della smobilitazione nell’Italia del Novecento, Verona 2007, 117-229.
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creation of the Italian empire, thus, started at the very moment at which Italian 
foreign policy had lost much of its autonomy. This has prevented Italians from 
having the ‘positive’, apolitical military remembrance of the war, imbued with 
a sense of military prowess and national pride, that has been able to flourish 
in other countries.11
Lack of academically sound scholarship on the subject from the immediate 
postwar years to the 1960s has resulted in a memory of the Italian occupation 
that has been strongly influenced by exculpating political agendas. In those 
years, historical writing about the Second World War was dominated by ac-
counts written by its protagonists, mostly high ranking officers who had held 
leading offices in the occupation administration, such as Mario Roatta.12 These 
accounts played a key role in consolidating the myth of the ‘good Italian’. They 
portrayed the bloody repression practised by the Italian authorities as simply 
a response to the brutality of the partisans. In the 1960s this situation changed 
slightly, thanks to the activity of scholars working within, or in collaboration 
with, the network of Institutes for the History of the Resistance Movement, 
such as Teodoro Sala and Enzo Collotti. Still based on a relatively tiny base 
of sources, a number of essays on the Italian occupation policy in Yugoslavia 
appeared in this context.13 Sala and Collotti took a convinced antifascist and 
procommunist stance, and thus their studies had a strong moral commitment 
to denounce the aggressive Fascist imperialist policy. Moreover they tried to 
establish bridges between Italian and Yugoslav historians and between Italian 
and Yugoslav perspectives on the Second World War.14
In the same years, but from a very different standpoint, the Historical Office 
of the Italian Army published several monographs on the role played by Italy 
in the Second World War, and in this framework a number of studies on Italian 
occupation policies appeared. These studies, too, dealt almost exclusively with 
Yugoslavia. They were mostly based on a very traditional military historical 
approach, and focused massively on the activities of the Italian army in the 
11  Such a positive, depoliticized memory of the war has, for example, persisted in the 
German veteran association. See the considerations in Konrad Köstlin, Erzählen vom Krieg – 
Krieg als Reise, Bios. Zeitschrift für Biographieforschung und Oral History 2, no. 2 (1989), 173-182.
12  For an overview of the first accounts of occupation in Yugoslavia, see Eric Gobetti, 
L’occupazione italiana in Jugoslavia (1941-1943). Storiografia e memoria pubblica, Passato 
e Presente 87 (2012), 39-53. As for Albania, the self-apologetic account by the former Italian 
governor (Luogotenente Generale) there has been highly influential: Francesco Jacomoni di San 
Savino, La politica dell’Italia in Albania, Rocca San Casciano 1965.
13  Enzo Collotti / Teodoro Sala / Giorgio Vaccarino, L’Italia nell’Europa danubiana durante 
la seconda guerra mondiale, Monza 1967; Enzo Collotti / Teodoro Sala, Le potenze dell’asse 
e la Jugoslavia. Saggi e documenti 1941/1943, Milano 1974; Teodoro Sala, Il fascismo italiano 
e gli Slavi del sud, Trieste 2008.
14  Massimo Pacetti, ed, L’imperialismo italiano e la Jugoslavia, atti del convegno italo-
jugoslavo, Ancona 14-16 ottobre 1977, Urbino 1978.
  243Beyond the Myth of the ‘Good Italian’
occupied regions. The title of a book published in 1978 by the Army’s Histori-
cal Branch, ‘The operations of Italian military units in Yugoslavia’ written by 
Salvatore Loi, gives a clear idea of how narrow the approach of these studies 
was.15 Most of these books were based on painstaking archival research, as 
the historians, who worked for the army—mostly officers themselves—had 
privileged access to the sources stored in the military archives. One of the main 
threads in this literature was to counter the widespread assumption that the 
Italian army had been weak and ineffective during the war and the occupation. 
Once again these publications stressed the reassuring myth that the Italian army 
had been relatively benign, very seldom guilty of war crimes, and if, then only 
in response to much worse atrocities committed by the partisans. At the end 
of his massive study on Yugoslavia, for example, Loi included a short chapter 
dealing with the lawfulness of the reprisals conducted by the Italians, and he 
concluded that they were only the ‘symmetrical response to preceding criminal 
acts committed by the enemy’.16
The intense debates on the antifascist legacy in Italian politics sparked by De 
Felice’s studies on Fascism17 and Claudio Pavone’s interpretation of the resist-
ance as a civil war18 did not address occupation policy as a part of the history 
of Italy during the Second World War period. Although Pavone’s enormously 
influential study did much to de-mythicize the image of Italian resistance activi-
ties as a war of the entire nation against the invader, acknowledging the willing 
support many Italians gave to the Fascist cause after 1943, it did not immediately 
spark any interest in the history of occupation. In the volume covering the Second 
World War in his massive Mussolini biography, Renzo de Felice devoted only 
20 pages to the occupation, and did so only to throw light on the development 
of the alliance between Berlin and Rome.19 Finally, it should be noted that, un-
like the German occupation of Europe, the Italian case has attracted only sparse 
interest within international historiography. An exception to this is the hotly 
debated issue of the rescue of the Jews in the occupied territories. This debate 
has revolved around the question as to whether the Italian authorities saved 
the Jews out of humanitarian concerns or whether it was, rather, political inter-
15  Salvatore Loi, Le operazioni delle unità italiane in Jugoslavia (1941-1943), Roma 1978.
16  Loi, Le operazioni, 256.
17  For an overview on the debate on De Felice’s theses cf. Tommaso Baris / Alessio Gagliardi, 
Le controversie sul Fascismo degli anni 60’ e 70’, Studi Storici 55, no.1 (2014), 317-333.
18  Claudio Pavone, Una guerra civile. Saggio storico sulla moralità nella Resistenza, Torino 
1991.
19  Renzo De Felice, Mussolini l’alleato 1940-1945, Torino 1990, 423-441.
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est at play.20 Last but not least, only a few significant studies published in the 
formerly occupied countries have been translated into Italian.21
Growing Attention to Fascist Italy’s Empire-Building
It is no surprise, then, that Rodogno’s book ‘Italy’s Mediterranean Empire’, 
published in 2003, was welcomed so enthusiastically by the academic com-
munity.22 It was the first comprehensive study of Italian occupation policies in 
Yugoslavia, Greece, Albania, and France during the Second World War. The 
path-breaking research in this book opened the way for a younger generation 
of historians to publish works dealing with the occupation of specific countries. 
Several factors led to this change. First, attempts made by some historians, 
and more particularly the popular media, to minimize the repressive nature of 
fascism and partially rehabilitate it sparked a heated discussion both in academia 
and amongst the wider public. This in turn led many scholars to investigate 
the more repressive activities of the Fascist regime, one of which was clearly 
the forced occupation of foreign countries. Secondly, in their endeavours to 
undermine the antifascist consensus in Italy, right-wing political forces placed 
a massive stress on the foibe massacres in Istria and Dalmatia and the exodus of 
Italians from those places after the war, leading to the establishment of a National 
Memorial Day, the so called Giorno del Ricordo, in 2004. This attracted renewed 
attention to the issue of the Eastern border in Italy’s history,23 and prompted 
historians working on the relations between Italy and the Slav-speaking area 
to extend their interest to the years during which Yugoslavia was occupied. 
International events fuelled this interest further, in particular the Yugoslav 
wars of the 1990s which brought the Balkan peninsula into the limelight. Last 
20  For the first view: Jonathan Steinberg, All or Nothing. The Axis and the Holocaust, 
1941-1943, London 1990; for the second: Davide Rodogno, ‘Italiani brava gente?’ Fascist Italy’s 
Policy toward the Jews in the Balkans, April 1941-July 1943, European History Quarterly 35, 
no. 2 (2005), 213-240.
21  For example, Tone Ferenc, La provincia ‘italiana’ di Lubiana: documenti 1941-1942, 
Udine 1994; Tone Ferenc, ‘Si ammazza troppo poco.’ Condannati a morte, ostaggi, passati 
per le armi nella provincia di Lubiana, 1941-1943. Documenti, Ljubljana 1999.
22  Reviewing the Italian edition, MacGregor Knox wrote: ‘Il nuovo ordine mediterraneo is 
a massive, systematic, and largely successful assault on that received wisdom [i. e. the Italiani 
brava gente myth]. Rodogno’s book derives from deep digging in hitherto almost inaccessible 
Italian army and Foreign Ministry files […]. [The book] offers a generally persuasive and 
sustained analysis of little-known, poorly understood, yet vitally important chapters in 
the history of Fascist Italy and of the war that it willed—and in which it duly perished.’ Cf. 
MacGregor Knox, Review of ‘D. Rodogno “Il nuovo ordine mediterraneo”’, Journal of Modern 
History 76, no. 4 (2004), 976-978.
23  Marina Cattaruzza, L’Italia e il confine orientale 1866-2006, Bologna 2007. Recently, the 
book was translated into English, including an update on the most recent decade: Italy and 
Its Eastern Border, 1866-2016, New York, London 2017.
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but not least, since 1990 Italian sources have become much more accessible to 
historians. In that year, the Historical Branches of the Army, Navy and Air Force 
became subject to general legislation on access to archives. As a consequence, 
most of the sources previously kept uncatalogued by modern archival criteria 
were put in order with the help of specialized staff.24 A period of relatively free 
access to these sources ensued. Unfortunately, in the last few years, renewed 
restrictions have been imposed, partially due to lack of resources.25
In the following section, I review some of the most relevant results, and also 
some of the shortcomings of the recent trends in studies on Italy’s occupation 
policies. Subsequently, I touch on some possible ways to overcome the short-
comings I have pinpointed.
Rodogno’s ‘Italy’s Mediterranean Empire’
In 2003 Davide Rodogno presented an overview of Italian policy in all the 
regions the country occupied. In its focus, his book was strongly influenced 
by questions regarding the nature of Italian Fascism which were being heav-
ily debated at the time it was written. Should Fascism be considered a form of 
totalitarianism or not? Could the transnational category of fascism be applied 
to the Italian case?26 Following on from this, at the very beginning of his book, 
Rodogno asked if the phenomenon of Italian occupation fell under the category 
of empire, or of empire-building. Drawing on the literature on the Roman Em-
pire, he considered a central feature of any empire to be centralization of power 
and the existence of a definite political leadership. Basically, this remained the 
focus of the book, which sought to demonstrate that Fascism had an imperial 
drive and that the reality of occupation, even when it contradicted Rome’s plans, 
was largely shaped by central plans nonetheless. This drew out comparisons 
with national socialism. Rodogno sought to demonstrate that, like Germany, 
Italy had developed plans to conquer its own ‘vital space’ or Lebensraum, which 
would be centred on the Mediterranean. ‘There is a distinctive feature,’ Rodogno 
wrote, ‘shared by the Fascist and Nazi regimes which evinces the close kinship 
(but not identity) between the two ideologies and the two regimes. I refer to the 
conquest of living space—of an empire—as an essential component of a totalitar-
24  The 1990 decree confirmed by law instructions that had been issued by the Ministry 
of Defence in 1979, cf. Silvia Trani, Il Regio esercito e i suoi archivi. Una storia di tutela e 
salvaguardia della memoria contemporanea, Roma 2013, 530. From the 1970s onwards the 
Historical Branch of the Army had made its records accessible to a restricted number of 
external researchers. Access was still granted upon discretionary decision of the military 
administration. Specialized personnel were employed in all three branches only in the 1990s.
25  Silvia Trani (with Pier Paolo Battistelli), The Italian Military Records of the Second World 
War, War in History 17, no. 3 (2010), 333-351.
26  Cf. Gentile, Fascismo.
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ian project to transform society.’27 To sum up, in Rodogno’s interpretation, two 
aspects are pivotal: occupation as a policy massively influenced by a totalitarian 
project; and the similarity between Fascist ambitions and those of the Nazis in 
their empire-building. 
As one of its most important contributions, the book brought to light a huge 
mass of primary sources that had never been used before. As mentioned, many 
relevant records were made available to a larger public in the 1990s, and Ro-
dogno made extensive use of the records of the military units employed in the 
occupied areas and the records of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thus 
Rodogno’s work can also be appreciated as a first comprehensive mapping of 
these sources. If this is one of the merits of the book, it is at the same time one of 
its limitations: Rodogno did not make use of any sources from countries other 
than Italy. However, his work did, for the first time, provide a clear overview 
of the structure of the occupation administrations in different regions. In addi-
tion, it dwelt on aspects of the Italian occupations largely neglected up to then, 
such as the relation between military and civil powers—the civil governors 
appointed by Mussolini in Dalmatia, Slovenia, and the Ionian and Cyclades 
Islands—the differences between annexed and formally independent but now 
occupied regions, and the interplay between the centre and the periphery in 
decision-making. Rodogno also included in his account the small, less studied 
occupied territories, such as the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea. His book 
contains interesting chapters in which, taking a modern grassroots approach, 
he deals with ordinary soldiers’ experiences and investigates the mentality and 
self-perception of the Italian army and the cohesion within it.
However, one of the consequences of his interpretation of Fascism as a form 
of totalitarianism, and a consequence also of the sources he used, was that his 
focus was on the centre of the Italian empire rather than on the peripheries. To 
be sure, Rodogno did not neglect the interaction between Rome’s planning and 
the reality of occupation, which had to be administered by the men on the spot. 
Even from the records of the Italian army alone—for example the historical logs 
kept by small military units—one can see beyond a purely occupier-centred 
analysis and grasp how local societies reacted to occupation. Moreover, Rodogno 
was very well aware that the contradictions between planning and actual oc-
cupation were huge, and he took this aspect into account. The theoretical tool 
he employed to frame this contradiction and to explain the interplay between 
the centre and the practices of the local authorities was an application of Ian 
Kershaw’s concept ‘Working towards the Führer’ to the Italian case: local admin-
istrators were ‘Working towards the Duce’. Although Rome’s hand was unable 
to reach its outposts and direct them significantly, leaving the local authorities 
27  Rodogno, Fascism’s European Empire, 44.
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with considerable room for manoeuvre, local officials, both military and civil 
(where these last were appointed) were, Rodogno argues, fully committed to 
fulfilling the will of Mussolini. 
As a consequence, in spite of his attempt to a give full account of the com-
plexity of the occupation system, poised as it was between centripetal and cen-
trifugal forces, Rodogno often overestimates the efficacy of planning. A short 
but telling example is the case of the Cyclades Islands, to which Rodogno 
devotes some pages of his book. A recent microhistorical study of the Island 
of Syros under Italian occupation, undertaken by Sheila Lecoeur, focuses on 
the policy of the two Italian governors of the Cyclades during the occupation 
of Greece.28 Lecoeur’s information mostly comes from the records of the local 
Italian administration, stored in the historical archives of Ermoupolis in Syros. 
Contrary to Rodogno’s account, Lecoeur shows convincingly how far the Italian 
governors departed from pursuing a planned imperialistic policy. A political 
middle-term plan was elaborated, the policy of so-called distacco (detachment), 
which aimed to detach the Cyclades from the mainland and attach them to the 
Italian colony of the Dodecanese. However, the policy of the governors was far 
more materially shaped by concerns arising from the dire effects of economic 
crisis and the need to administer the islands. In this case, therefore, the concept 
of ‘Working towards the Duce’ does not help explain the interaction between 
centre and periphery. Study of the interplay between local society and the local 
authorities has a stronger explanatory value. 
The comparison of Italian Fascism with nazism in Rodogno’s book has a po-
litical and moralistic undertone. By placing Fascism in the same analytic box 
as Hitler’s creed, he seeks to stress that Fascism should not be ‘banalized’, but 
should rather be seen as akin to the ‘absolute evil’.29 This is a commendable 
endeavour in itself, as the myth of the ‘good Italian’ is still widespread in Ital-
ian public opinion; but it has misled many Italian historians, especially those 
of the left, into downplaying the complexity of the history of the societies that 
were occupied.
Moreover, it is very doubtful whether Ian Kershaw’s analytic tool ‘Working 
towards the Führer’ can be used in conjunction with the concept of totalitari-
anism. Kershaw explicitly proposed it as an alternative to the latter. He saw in 
the concept a feature peculiar to the Third Reich, a dynamic of radicalization 
28  Sheila Lecoeur, Mussolini’s Greek Island. Fascism and the Italian Occupation of Syros 
in World War II, London 2009.
29  It is worth remembering that the argument concerning the different natures of Italian 
Fascism and German national socialism was one of the main, and most criticized, theses put 
forward by Renzo De Felice.
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from below deriving from ‘the undermining and collapse of what one might 
call “rational” structures of rule’,30 rather than an ideological guideline.
This problematic aspect of Rodogno’s work—shared by many studies that 
have followed—derives, I am convinced, from a distorted reception of the 
historiography of the Third Reich. Scholarship on Nazi Germany from the 
1970s onwards, for example the structuralist approach and the more recent 
Volksgemeinschaft current represented by Michael Wildt, have clearly moved 
away from a top-down perspective.31 But it is the latter that remains implicit 
in the totalitarianism approach. Moreover, a recent trend in the study of Nazi 
policy in Eastern Europe, especially in the field of Holocaust studies, is to move 
beyond intentionalist approaches and to embrace a perspective that stresses 
the multidirectionality of extreme violence, which is seen as a complex social 
phenomenon implying a large array of actors and motivations, not as a coherent 
chain of events originating from planning or intent.32 Much Italian historiogra-
phy seems to remain attached to an old and outmoded interpretation of nazism. 
It still employs the concept of totalitarianism in order to counter attempts by 
revisionist historians to downplay the criminal or repressive policies carried 
out by the Fascist regime.
Recent Studies on Italian Occupation 
The weaknesses I have highlighted in Rodogno’s study do not lessen its sig-
nificance as a pioneering work. Besides being itself an insightful, well-written 
monument of research, Fascism’s European Empire paved the way for the devel-
opment of academically sound scholarship on Italian occupation policy in the 
Balkans.33 In the last twenty years, the topic has become an established field of 
research in Italy. The generational factor still plays a key role, as even today this 
30  Ian Kershaw, ‘Working Towards the Führer’. Reflections on the Nature of the Hitler 
Dictatorship, Contemporary European History 2, no. 2 (1993), 103-118, 104.
31  For the structuralist approach see the classic work Gerhard Hirschfeld / Lothar Kettenacker, 
eds, Der ‘Führerstaat’. Mythos und Realität. Studien zur Struktur und Politik des Dritten 
Reiches, Stuttgart 1981. For the Volksgemeinschaft approach, see Martina Steber / Bernhard 
Gotto, eds, Visions of Community in Nazi Germany, Oxford 2014.
32  See Christian Gerlach’s critique of the concept of genocide, Christian Gerlach, Extremely 
Violent Societies. An Alternative to the Concept of Genocide, Journal of Genocide Research 84, 
no. 4 (2006), 455-471. An application of this concept to the case of Yugoslavia during World 
War Two is Alexander Korb, Im Schatten des Weltkrieges. Massengewalt der Ustaša gegen 
Serben, Juden und Roma 1941-1945, Hamburg 2013.
33  Given the regional focus of this article, I do not deal with the Italian occupation of parts 
of France, which Rodogno did include in his study. A recent publication, adopting a grassroots 
perspective is Emanuele Sica, Mussolini’s Army in the French Riviera. Italy’s Occupation of 
France, Urbana, Chicago, Springfield 2016.
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field is occupied mostly by junior scholars, often in the stage of their doctoral 
dissertations.
The literature published in the last twenty years focuses on a series of discrete 
subjects. A central place is given to the issue of Italian war crimes.34 In the last 
ten years, considerable numbers of studies have appeared in Italy detailing the 
way Italian war criminals escaped prosecution by Libyan, Ethiopian, Yugoslav, 
Greek, and Albanian tribunals after the war.35 As one can easily imagine, this 
subject has sparked animated public discussion, prompting many Italian schol-
ars to investigate anew the war crimes committed during occupation. So, for 
example, in a number of articles Lidia Santarelli has examined the repressive 
policy practised by the Italian army in Greece.36 In particular, she has dealt with 
the massacre of the entire male population of the village of Domenikon in Thes-
saly carried out in February 1943. The massacre had been mentioned in some 
publications but had never been studied in detail and with the use of Italian 
sources.37 Santarelli’s study has decisively thrown into question the traditional 
image of the Sagapò Army—the idea, which the British were already propagat-
ing during the war, that the Italian soldiers stationed on Greek territory had had 
a rather peaceful coexistence with the native population, engaging in intimate 
relationships with the women.38 Basing her work on Italian military sources, 
34  A recent overview can be found in Alberto Stramaccioni, Crimini di guerra. Storia e 
memoria del caso italiano, Bari 2016.
35  Filippo Focardi, La questione della punizione dei criminali di guerra in Italia dopo la 
fine del secondo conflitto mondiale, Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und 
Bibliotheken 80 (2000), 543-624; Filippo Focardi / Lutz Klinkhammer, La questione dei ‘criminali 
di guerra’ italiani e una commissione di inchiesta dimenticata, Contemporanea 4, no. 3 (2001), 
497-528; Davide Conti, Criminali di guerra italiani: accuse, processi e impunità nel secondo 
dopoguerra, Roma 2011.
36  Lidia Santarelli, La violenza taciuta. I crimini degli italiani nella Grecia occupata, 
in: Luca Baldissara / Paolo Pezzino, eds, Crimini e memorie di guerra. Violenze contro le 
popolazioni e politiche del ricordo, Napoli 2004, 271-291; Lidia Santarelli, Muted Violence. 
Italian War Crimes in Occupied Greece, Journal of Modern Italian Studies 9, no. 3 (2004), 280-299; 
cf. also Lidia Santarelli, Fra coabitazione e conflitto. Invasione italiana e popolazione civile 
nella Grecia occupata. Primavera – estate 1941, Qualestoria 30, no. 1 (2002), 143-155. Besides 
Santarelli’s articles, see the essay by the Director of the Historical Branch of the Army’s Archives 
Lieutenant Colonel Filippo Cappellano, L’occupazione italiana della Grecia (1941-43), Nuova 
Storia Contemporanea 12, no. 4 (2008), 19-46.
37  Hagen Fleischer, Im Kreuzschatten der Mächte: Griechenland 1941-1944 (Okkupation 
– Resistance – Kollaboration), Frankfurt/M. et al. 1986. Cf. also the early Greek publication, 
Iannis E. Gotsis, Floges ston Olympo, Athens 1945, 21-28. The massacre of Domenikon has been 
the subject of a documentary entitled ‘La guerra sporca di Mussolini’ (Mussolini’s Dirty War) 
directed by Giovanni Donfrancesco with the assistance of Lidia Santarelli. The documentary 
has had a wide impact, especially since being broadcast by ‘History Channel’ in 2008.
38  It is difficult to trace this stereotyped perception back to its origins and see how its role 
in the construction of the war memory both in Italy and Greece (where the myth of the Sagapò 
army is as strong and widespread as in Italy) started up. The existence of a considerable number 
of cases of intimate relations between Greek women and Italian soldiers, quite often leading 
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Lidia Santarelli could show for the first time that the violent acts committed by 
the Italians were part of a policy consciously planned and ordered by the Italian 
military authorities in Greece, in particular by General Carlo Geloso. In February 
1943, for example, an official letter was issued by Geloso giving directives for 
the fight against the partisans. This document, according to Santarelli, is ‘one 
of the most significant documents in the process of planning and organizing 
the military violence that characterized the Italian policy of repression in the 
occupied territories’.39 Geloso’s directives made no distinction between parti-
sans and civilians. Thus, along with other documented instances mentioned in 
Santarelli’s article, this source proves that the indiscriminate killing carried out 
by Italian soldiers was part of a policy of brutalization initiated from above. 
Amedeo Osti Guerrazzi comes to very similar conclusions in a recent publica-
tion on Slovenia.40 Among the territories occupied by the Italians, Slovenia stands 
out for the extreme violence with which the Italian Royal Army repressed the 
resistance. Drawing on a considerable number of Italian military sources, Osti 
Guerrazzi examines whether it was a case of what he calls ‘hot violence’—vio-
lence developing on the battlefield with a strong situational element—or ‘cold 
violence’, planned by the higher ranks of the army and then carried out by the 
men they commanded. Osti Guerrazzi answers that the propensity to violence 
was systematically induced by the higher authorities of the army by means of 
indoctrination of the troops. It was not the war itself that led to forms of brutali-
zation, but the peculiarities of the fascist struggle with its strong ideologization 
based on a racist worldview. Inspired by scholarly debates on the conduct of 
the Wehrmacht during the war, especially by Omer Bartov’s studies, the book 
aims to show that Italian military forces were part and parcel of the regime and 
seeks to demystify the narrative of the ‘clean Italian army’.41 
Recent studies published by the Historical Office of the Italian Army have 
broadened their approach and deal with the occupational setting as a whole, 
rather than just with the army itself. So, for example, the scope of some of the 
to marriages, is supported by direct evidence, cf. Marco Clementi, Camice nere sull’Acropoli. 
L’occupazione italiana della Grecia (1941-1943), Roma 2013, 343. We do not know, however, 
what cultural processes enabled the Sagapò myth to establish itself as the Greek version of 
the more general myth of the Italian as a benign occupier. It would be interesting to unravel 
what collective experiences and feelings merged into this strongly gendered form of recalling 
the occupation period, and worth some in-depth research.
39  Santarelli, Muted Violence, 291.
40  Amedeo Osti Guerrazzi, L’esercito italiano in Slovenia 1941-1943. Strategie di repressione 
antipartigiana, Roma 2011 (Engl. translation, The Italian Army in Slovenia. Strategies of 
Antipartisan Repression, 1941-1943, Basingstoke 2013).
41  The book is influenced by Osti Guerrazzi’s participation in a German research group 
that worked on British and American transcripts of German war prisoners’ conversations. 
Harald Welzer / Sönke Neitzel, eds, ‘Der Führer war wieder viel zu human, viel zu gefühlvoll.’ 
Der Zweite Weltkrieg aus der Sicht deutscher und italienischer Soldaten, Frankfurt/M. 2011.
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more recent publications has departed from outdated traditional military his-
tory and stretches out to other issues, such as military collaboration and the 
occupation system as a whole.42 However, in these studies there is still a ten-
dency to disregard foreign sources and even foreign secondary literature, and 
this inevitably results in a strong Italocentric approach.
Regarding the issue of the war crimes themselves, no consensus has yet been 
reached. The scholarship surrounding them is still divided between the con-
clusions of two opposing factions. Though not denying the repressive policy 
practised by the military in the occupied territories, historians attached to the 
Historical Office of the Army continue to stress the ‘reactive nature’ of the 
excesses committed. They downplay the army’s responsibility for the brutal 
treatment of civilians and captured partisans. A recent publication on the Ital-
ian occupation of Croatia, for example, affirms in the introduction to a chapter 
on war crimes that ‘most historians agree that the Italian violence was, in es-
sence, a “reactive” and not a “preventive” one, as […] were the German and 
the Croatian [Ustasha] ones’.43 As already shown in discussion of Amedeo Osti 
Guerrazzi and Lidia Santarelli, anti-revisionist historians take a different stance. 
They highlight the responsibility the higher military ranks had for the immoral 
and illegal conduct of the army, showing that the officers’ corps had been thor-
oughly ‘fascistized’ at the onset of the war and how it acted accordingly. Many 
such historians give strong weight to the much-discussed Circular 3C, a booklet 
issued by General Mario Roatta in March 1942, which contains instructions for 
the conduct of troops engaged in antipartisan warfare. In this text, Roatta, then 
Commander of the Second Army garrisoned in regions of Yugoslavia, clearly 
expressed his will to transform his feeble Italian soldiers into men motivated 
by a ‘steely determination to destroy the enemy’.44 
Thus, what has remained contentious is the degree to which Italian armed 
forces were ‘fascistized’ during the Fascist era and committed crimes follow-
ing this ideology. Those who maintain that Italy had an imperialistic drive and 
committed war crimes are opposed to those who hold that the army behaved 
correctly during the war and even mitigated Mussolini’s aggressive bid for 
expansion. Both sides of the debate refer back to their own political agendas. 
However, in light of what recent historians have uncovered, it is untenable to 
affirm that the Italian army did not consistently support Fascism’s imperialis-
42  Marco Cuzzi, L’occupazione italiana della Slovenia (1941-1943), Roma 1998; Alberto 
Becherelli / Paolo Formiconi, La quinta sponda. Una storia dell’occupazione italiana della 
Croazia, 1941-1943, Roma 2015.
43  Becherelli / Formiconi, La quinta sponda, 202.
44  James H. Burgwyn, General Roatta’s War against the Partisans in Yugoslavia: 1942, 
Journal of Modern Italian Studies 9, no. 3 (2004), 314-329, here 317. The same author has made an 
overview of the Italian occupation of Yugoslavia, James H. Burgwyn, Empire on the Adriatic. 
Mussolini’s Conquest of Yugoslavia, 1941-1943, New York 2005.
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tic drive. Moreover, today, the myth of the Resistenza, created by the political 
centre-left after the war, is the butt of bitter criticism from leftist historians as 
well, since it has contributed greatly to the self-acquitting myth that allowed 
the Italian Fascist experience to be swept under the carpet.
In recent years, a feeling of dissatisfaction has been growing among historians 
over the excessive centrality the war crimes issue has taken in studies of the oc-
cupation. So, for example, in the introduction to his monograph on the Italian 
occupation of Greece—the first comprehensive study of the subject published 
in Italy—Marco Clementi states that, when he undertook his research in 2009, 
he felt that existing scholarship on the Italian occupation in the Balkans was 
obsessed with uncovering war crimes.45 His own research aim, by contrast, was 
to shed light on ‘occupational everyday life’: he was interested in the ‘normal-
ity’ of the occupation, rather than the exceptional occurrences of resistance 
and counterinsurgency. Based on Greek and Italian sources, his book devotes 
a chapter to describing the terrible famine that hit Greece, and it has several 
sections on Italian policy in different areas of the country such as the Ionian 
Islands and the Cyclades, where Italian civil governors were appointed, and 
the Dodecanese, which had been under semi-colonial rule from Italy since 1912. 
Finally, the last chapters of the book narrate the story of Italo-Greek relations 
between September 1943 and the Peace Treaty of 1947.
Several other scholars from the younger generation have gone beyond the 
archives of the occupiers and, increasingly, have taken into account sources from 
the occupied countries themselves. Remarkable in this respect is the work of Eric 
Gobetti, who has focused his research on the Italian occupation of Yugoslavia, 
using both Italian and Yugoslav records. Not primarily a historian of Fascism, 
Gobetti does not adopt an Italocentric view, but takes into account the dynamics 
of the occupied society. While one of Gobetti’s monographs focuses on Croatia, 
a second provides an overview of all the areas of Yugoslavia that were occupied 
by Italy, albeit in different juridical forms (annexation, bogus independence, 
military occupation).46 Among the many themes he deals with in his books, 
Gobetti examines the reasons behind the alliances the Italian authorities made 
in Yugoslavia, especially the alliance with the Serbian Chetniks in occupied 
Croatia and Montenegro. As is well known, the initial pro-Croatian policy of 
the Italians was soon replaced by a broad system of alliances with other ethnic 
groups, concentrating on Serb collaboration. Gobetti stresses the purely military 
45  Clementi, Camicie nere sull’Acropoli.
46  On Croatia, Eric Gobetti, L’occupazione allegra. Gli italiani in Jugoslavia (1941-1943), 
Roma 2007; on Yugoslavia, Eric Gobetti, Alleati del nemico. L’occupazione italiana in Jugoslavia 
(1941-1943), Roma, Bari 2013. The author has devoted other essays to related subjects, for 
example, Eric Gobetti, Dittatore per caso. Un piccolo duce protetto dall’Italia fascista, Napoli 
2001; Eric Gobetti, L’occupazione italiana in Montenegro. I principali nodi storiografici, Italia 
Contemporanea 260 (2010), 475-493.
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rationale for this choice, and the fact that the decision to shift alliance from the 
Croats to the Serbs was taken by the men on the spot—principally the military 
commanders of the Italian troops in Yugoslavia. Only after the event was this 
decision sanctioned by the politicians in Rome. Gobetti’s studies show that in 
Yugoslavia, as in all the territories occupied by Italy, the balance of power shifted 
increasingly to the military after the first months of occupation, and it was the 
men on the spot who subsequently determined most of the policies adopted.
Gobetti’s conclusions about the policratic nature of power structures through-
out occupied Yugoslavia and the shift of power towards the military authorities 
are confirmed by a recent study by Federico Goddi.47 Goddi’s monograph is an 
in-depth scrutiny of a relatively tiny region, Montenegro, which the Italians tried 
to turn into a puppet state. This project was dropped after the uprising of July 
1941, and a military governership instated. Goddi’s study broadens the picture 
of what occupation entailed, giving considerable weight to hitherto less-explored 
aspects. Basing his work on a large selection of Italian and Montenegrin sources, 
he shows that the Italian authorities failed to provide the new political bodies 
they had established with economic self-sufficiency. Through lack of a proper 
decision-making process and because they envisaged a customs and monetary 
union of all their occupied regions (though it was never implemented), the Ital-
ians gave priority to political considerations. Thus, to give but one example, 
when drawing up the borders of the Protectorate of Montenegro, they decided to 
annex the Ulcinj region to Albania. This was part of a project to realize a ‘Greater 
Albania’; but, by detaching Ulcinj from Montenegro the Italians undermined 
the local economy, which was based on salt extracted from the Ulcinj mines. 
As Goddi illustrates, the contradictions within the Italian occupation policy 
laid the foundations of its own failure from the very beginning. Indeed, the 
revolt of July 1941, traditionally ascribed exclusively to political grievances, is 
explained by Goddi with reference to the hardships the population was suffering 
in a blighted economic situation. A further innovative aspect of Goddi’s study 
is its focus on the activities of the Italian military justice system in occupied 
Montenegro, encompassing not only the Military Tribunal in Cetinje but also 
extraordinary military tribunals which single military units were allowed to 
set up. Goddi painstakingly details what these tribunals did, imposing harsh 
sentences on opponents—though, contrary to a common view in the Montene-
grin historiography, death sentences were relatively few—and exercising a sort 
of micro-repression against the local population, inflicting a large number of 
minor sentences that impacted on the population’s everyday life. 
A more traditional line of study with a different kind of focus is diplomatic 
history. Heavily based on diplomatic sources, a number of studies analyse the 
47  Federico Goddi, Fronte Montenegro. L’occupazione militare italiana 1941-1943, Gorizia 
2016.
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relations between Italy and the independent state of Croatia.48 Italian policy in 
the regions of Kosovo attached to Albania in 1941 has been examined in the same 
way.49 These studies provide valuable insights, but they rarely reach beyond 
the investigation of interstate relations. 
Research Lacunae
After twenty years of research, we have a much clearer picture of Italian oc-
cupation policy than we did in the 1990s, and many of the shortcomings of the 
first research studies have been overcome. Nevertheless there are still many 
blank spots that, in my opinion, need to be filled. 
This need applies, in the first place, to regions yet to get their share of attention. 
Most of the studies on Italian occupation have focused on Yugoslavia; only a few 
have dealt with Greece, and still fewer have tackled Albania, though there are 
a number of research articles,50 and some publications by authors who do not 
make use of Italian sources.51 This last issue is a huge desideratum, as Albania 
was the only country occupied by Italy without German military aid, and where, 
in consequence, Italy was able to conduct its own policy without German en-
croachment. A clearer picture of Albania under Italian rule might serve to give 
us a ‘pure model’ of Italian imperialist policy, enabling a better understanding 
of the situation in other areas like Yugoslavia and Greece. Moreover in Albania, 
more than anywhere else, the Italian administrators had to come to terms with 
a traditional clan structure, and rely on it locally in order to exercise its own 
power. A case study on how this traditional society responded and adapted to 
foreign occupation would be very interesting. 
Existing studies on Italian occupation in Greece tend to focus on war crimes 
and the role of the army; only a few look at the overall policy of the occupying 
power. A crucial but still unaccomplished task is to discover what factors in-
48  Cf. the essays collected in Francesco Caccamo / Luciano Monzali, eds, L’occupazione 
italiana della Iugoslavia (1941-1943), Florence 2008; Luciano Monzali, Antonio Tacconi e la 
comunità italiana di Spalato, Venezia 2007.
49  Luca Micheletta, La resa dei conti. Il Kosovo, l’Italia e la dissoluzione della Jugoslavia 
(1939-1941), Roma 2008.
50  Most of these are by the Italian historian Giovanni Villari. Cf. Giovanni Villari, L’Albania 
tra protettorato ed occupazione (1935-1943), Qualestoria 30, no. 1 (2002), 117-127; Giovanni 
Villari, A Failed Experiment. The Exportation of Fascism to Albania, Modern Italy 12, no. 2 
(2007), 157-171; Giovanni Villari, Il sistema di occupazione fascista in Albania, in: Laura 
Brazzo / Michele Sarfatti, eds, Gli ebrei in Albania sotto il fascismo. Una storia da ricostruire, 
Firenze 2010, 93-124; Giovanni Villari, Repressione e resistenze in Albania, Qualestoria 43, no. 2 
(2015), 81-97. Also Federico Niglia, Alleati, nemici, banditi, politica di occupazione e lotta alle 
‘bande’ in Albania, Nuova Storia Contemporanea 16, no. 5 (2012), 47-64.
51  Bernd Jürgen Fischer, Albania at War, 1939-1945, West Lafayette/IN 1999; Hubert 
Neuwirth, Widerstand und Kollaboration in Albanien 1939-1944, Wiesbaden 2008.
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fluenced the dynamics of violence in the areas of Greece which Italy occupied. 
Greek scholars have recently stressed the importance of a food supply crisis, 
of internal conflicts within the occupied society in multiethnic areas, and of 
the collapse of the state.52 Increased cooperation between Italian and Greek 
scholars might be of great value here. It would be good to forge a stronger link 
between their respective national historiographies, which have so far developed 
in separate ways.
There are still too few overviews of Italian war aims and plans for postwar 
reshaping of the occupied regions. Although Italian goals in the Balkans were 
never elaborated to the extent that Nazi Germany’s were in some of the regions 
it occupied, the subject would merit more in-depth analysis. There is a huge gap 
in our knowledge concerning economic aspects of the occupation. As yet, only 
a handful of scholars have conducted research in this field.53 It is established that 
Germany had the lion’s share in exploiting the Balkan area,54 but we do not have 
a clear picture of the economic relations between Italy and its occupied regions 
during the war. To which extent did Italy exploit these regions to strengthen its 
own weak war economy, following the example of Germany?55 How did Italian 
occupation impact on local economies, and how did economic developments 
influence the spread of violence in the occupied regions?
A further shortcoming in studies of Italian occupation is related to the sources 
most of them employ. An overemphasis on Italian sources and Italian second-
ary literature is still prevalent and leads many scholars to part-identify with 
the perspectives of their sources. Often the result is scholarship that remains 
too firmly entrenched in debates surrounding the interpretation of Italian his-
tory, and at risk of reproducing the colonial outlook of the occupiers. It would 
certainly help scholars overcome this limitation if they made greater use of local 
sources and drew on documents of different provenance. German sources are 
of particular importance. Disregard of these prevents historians from getting 
a clear picture of the intentions and policies of the various German agencies also 
involved in occupation. In Italian writing, the German occupation authorities 
are often simplistically referred to as ‘the German ally’, overlooking the fact that 
German decision-making, it is now generally acknowledged, had a polycratic 
52  See Nikos Maratzidis / Georgios Antoniou, The Axis Occupation and Civil War. Changing 
Trends in Greek Historiography, 1941-2002, Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 2 (2004), 223-231; 
and Polymeris Voglis’ and Ioannis Nioutsikos’ contribution to this issue.
53  See Alessandro Roselli, Italia e Albania. Relazioni finanziarie nel ventennio fascista, 
Bologna 1986 (English edition, Italy and Albania. Financial Relations in the Fascist Period, 
London et al. 2006); Rodogno, Nuovo ordine mediterraneo, 278-313; Goddi, Montenegro, 39-92.
54  For comparison, cf. König, Kooperation als Machtkampf, 177-226.
55  For an overview of German economic policy in the occupied regions: Hein Klemann / Sergei 
Kudryashov, Occupied Economies. An Economic History of Nazi-Occupied Europe, 1939-
1945, London, New York 2012.
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nature too. Moreover, the use of German sources could provide a refreshing 
‘external’ view of Italian policy. Finally, it could help historians establish links 
and transfers between the two occupying regimes and draw systematic com-
parisons between them.56 As regards Italian sources, many remain unexplored 
and a dismaying number are inaccesible. In the first place, this is due to the 
chronic lack of financial resources in the Italian archival system, which has 
considerably worsened in the last ten years, making even officially accessible 
records practically unavailable.57 In addition, many institutions, wanting to 
keep a monopoly on interpretation, maintain an intentional policy of keeping 
important records out of the reach of researchers.58
Most scholarship on occupation during the war still gives overwhelming 
attention to the repressive policies that were practised. This is understandable, 
given the intense debate surrounding the issue; but even within this field there 
is a tendency to narrow the scope of research to anti-partisan warfare. This 
blocks out consideration of other instruments of repression employed by the 
occupying powers. Recent studies are bringing to light strategies of food de-
nial, for example, which the occupation authorities used to force populations 
to succumb to their will.59 Issues still to be examined are the impact of such 
lower intensity repression on the occupied societies, and their reaction to it. 
The Italian occupation authorities used systematic internment as an instrument 
of repression against opponents, and also to achieve political or ethnic goals. 
Spartaco Capogreco, an Italian historian who has dedicated intensive research 
efforts to the internment of civilians in Fascist Italy, has calculated that 26,000 
Montenegrins and 25,000 Slovenians were interned during the occupation.60 
Other scholars have followed his lead. Basing her assessment on scattered 
sources, Alessandra Kersevan considers that a figure of approximately 100,000 
internees from the zones of Yugoslavia under Italian rule would be not far off 
the mark.61 There are still no similar studies for Greece and Albania, although 
56  How productive this field of research can be is demonstrated by Patrick Bernhard, 
Hitler’s Africa in the East. Italian Colonialism as a Model for German Planning in Eastern 
Europe, Journal of Contemporary History 51, no. 1 (2015), 1-30.
57  For more information on this, see the internet page of the Italian Society for the Study of 
Contemporary History (SISSCO), http://www.sissco.it/articoli/documento-sissco-su-archivi-
e-biblioteche-pubbliche/. All internet references were accessed on 19 March 2017.
58  A patent instance is the situation of the archives of the Military Ordinariate (Ordinariato 
Militare) that continues to deny access to external researchers.
59  Yannis Skalidakis, From Resistance to Counterstate. The Making of Revolutionary 
Power in the Liberated Zones of Occupied Greece, 1943-1944, Journal of Modern Greek Studies 
33, no. 1 (2015), 155-184.
60  Carlo Spartaco Capogreco, Una storia rimossa dell’Italia fascista. L’internamento dei 
civili jugoslavi (1941-1943), Studi Storici 42, no. 1 (2001), 203-230.
61  Alessandra Kersevan, Lager italiani. Pulizia etnica e campi di concentramento fascisti 
per civili jugoslavi 1941-1943, Rome 2008, 102 and passim.
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we know that wide-ranging internment of civilians was practised in both re-
gions.62 Opponents of the regime were detained not only in their own regions 
but were transferred en masse to Italy, where they were interned along with 
other categories of detainee and often employed in forced labour. The numbers 
involved suggest that internment may have impacted significantly on the oc-
cupied societies. However, there has been no attempt to deal with this topic 
systematically.63
A related question, still to be investigated, is whether, like Germany and 
many of its allies, Italy planned population transfers in its occupied regions, 
and, if so, to what extent. As far as we know, Italy did expel local populations 
from annexed regions like Dalmatia and Slovenia.64 Was there a plan for the 
ethnic reshaping of occupied regions for a settled postwar Italian empire?65 
And was there continuity, in personnel or transfer of ideas, between the policy 
of ethnic homogeneization conducted during the interwar period in the ‘new’ 
northeastern provinces and policies implemented during the war?66 These 
last questions are particularly pertinent, as during World War II population 
transfer and ethnic engineering became common practice in Europe: there was 
a transnational culture of deportation shared by Germany, its allies, and the 
collaborationist elites of the occupied countries.67
62  First data in Rodogno, Nuovo ordine mediterraneo, 397-431. A group of young journalists 
has conducted an interesting project aimed at mapping all the places of internment in Italy 
and abroad, collecting sources on them and making them available to the public on an 
interactive map, http://www.campifascisti.it. The project achieved interesting results but it 
was suspended due to lack of funds.
63  It is beyond the scope of this article to deal with the literature on Italian soldiers 
in German captivity—Italian military internees (Italienische Militärinternierte, IMI)—after 
the armistice of September 1943. Although there are relatively more studies on this topic 
than on the occupation, many blank spots remain in this area too. It is remarkable that the 
most comprehensive studies on this subject have been published by German historians, 
cf. Gerhard Schreiber, Die italienischen Militärinternierten im deutschen Machtbereich, 
1943-1945. Verraten – verachtet – vergessen, München et al. 1990; Gabriele Hammermann, 
Zwangsarbeit für den ‘Verbündeten’. Die Arbeits- und Lebensbedingungen der italienischen 
Militärinternierten in Deutschland 1943-1945, Tübingen 2002.
64  Rodogno, Nuovo ordine mediterraneo, 322-324.
65  An interesting instance is the plan developed by the Undersecretary for Albania 
(Sottosegretariato Albania) to create a common border between Albania and Romania, remove 
the Serb population from the border area and resettle it with Aromenians, cf. Micheletta, La 
resa dei conti, 117. A proposal for a population exchange between Albanians and Slavs was 
made by the Italian Lieutenant-General of the King in Albania, Francesco Jacomoni, in 1941, 
Goddi, Montenegro, 51.
66  Rolf Wörsdörfer, Krisenherd Adria 1915-1955. Konstruktion und Artikulation des 
Nationalen im italienisch-jugoslawischen Grenzraum, Paderborn 2004, 221-313.
67  For an overview, Pertti Ahonen et al., People on the Move. Forced Population Movements 
in Europe in the Second World War and Its Aftermath, Oxford, New York 2008.
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A final field to be explored concerns the continuities that may have existed 
between the prewar colonial experience of military and administrative person-
nel—indeed of Italian society as a whole—and attitudes and practices main-
tained during the war itself. Several publications point to such continuities, and 
this is only to be expected since many military and civil servants had served in 
the colonies. But existing studies do not go beyond what, in 1992, Teodoro Sala 
called a ‘colonial hypothesis’.68 Apart from a study of personnel continuities yet 
to be made, there is a need to investigate continuities in the cultural history of 
imperialism. Since Italian historiography has recently joined the international 
trend towards culturalization in studies of empire,69 it is surprising that nobody 
has tried to show if imperial imagery was at work in establishing and manag-
ing the occupation of the Balkan countries in the war years, and, if so, what its 
character was and what it may have owed to prewar experiences. This is all the 
more surprising since the 1936 Italian war against Ethiopia has recently attracted 
the interest of many historians, non-Italians among them.70
To sum up, many of the shortcomings I point out in this article have arisen 
because, in Italy, questions surrounding the history of occupation have long 
been treated as only an element in the study of Fascism—as Fascism in a par-
ticular setting. This narrowed approach is partly due to the fact that Italy has 
only a weak tradition of area studies on Southeastern Europe. It cannot compare 
with Germany, where Southeast European History is an established field with 
chairs at several universities, or the Anglo-Saxon world, which promotes Balkan 
Studies, nor with Southeastern Europe itself. A second reason lies in the severely 
delayed reception of international scholarship in Italian history faculties.71 These 
have been slow to take in recent literature on German occupation policy, which 
has started to shift its focus from national socialism to the occupied societies 
themselves. Moreover, continued harping on the ‘good Italian versus bad Italian’ 
68  Teodoro Sala, Guerra e amministrazione in Jugoslavia 1941-1943: un’ipotesi coloniale, 
in: Bruna Micheletti / Pier Paolo Poggio, eds, L’Italia in guerra 1940-43, Brescia 1992. Further 
considerations on this can be found in Gobetti, Alleati del nemico, 92-93. The role of colonial 
experience in the formation of military personnel employed in Montenegro has been 
investigated in Goddi, Montenegro, 154-172.
69  Roberta Pergher, Impero immaginato, impero vissuto. Recenti sviluppi nella storiografia 
del colonialismo italiano, Ricerche di Storia Politica 10, no. 1 (2007), 53-66.
70  Aram Mattioli, eds, Der erste faschistische Vernichtungskrieg. Die italienische Aggression 
gegen Äthiopien 1935-1941, Luzern 2005; Giulia Brogini Künzi, Italien und der Abessinienkrieg 
1935/36. Kolonialkrieg oder totaler Krieg?, Paderborn et al. 2006; Robert Mallett, Mussolini in 
Ethiopia, 1919-1935. The Origins of Fascist Italy’s African War, New York 2015.
71  In a recent appraisal of the state of Italian contemporary history, Christof Dipper 
has criticized its low degree of internationalization, cf. Christof Dipper, Die italienische 
Zeitgeschichtsforschung. Eine Momentaufnahme, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 63, no. 3 
(2015), 351-378. Dipper’s article will be discussed in the forthcoming issue of the journal Italia 
Contemporanea.
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theme (primarily an issue of national identity) has blinkered Italian historians 
and prevented them from developing a transnational approach. Though, in 
recent years, a new generation of scholars has brought important innovations 
to the field of occupation studies, there are still considerable gaps to fill.
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